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How to Reduce Market 
Penetration Cycle Times
Thomas S. Robertson
Academics, executives, and consultants are virtual-ly unanimous on the importance of speed as acompetitive advantage and the need to achieve
more rapid strategic decision making:
Strategy making has changed. . . . The premium now
is on moving fast and keeping pace. . . . The best strate-
gies are irrelevant if they take too long to formulate.1
— Kathleen M. Eisenhardt 
Stanford University
Speed kills the competition.2
— Richard D. Stewart
Chief Executive Officer
Computer Corporation of America  
As a strategic weapon, time is the equivalent of
money, productivity, quality, even innovation.3
— George Stalk, Jr.
Boston Consulting Group
Perhaps the most prevalent focus on speed has been
in new product development. Japanese companies have
been heralded as models of how to achieve time-based
advantages in reaching the market. Honda, Sony,
Canon, and Toshiba, among others, have been cited for
their abilities to reduce product development cycle times
and to introduce a constant stream of new products or
product improvements responsive to evolving customer
needs. Recently, many leading U.S. and European firms
also have adopted a time-based philosophy and are sub-
stantially reducing product development cycles.
Benetton is a well-known example. Management has
recognized the extreme difficulties of forecasting de-
mand for style and fashion and has built the firm’s com-
petitive advantage on a production and logistics system
that is enormously responsive to initial seasonal sales
data. Hewlett-Packard is also cited as a leading example
of reduced time to market. The advantages, according to
former Chief Executive Officer (CEO) John Young, are
not only faster market access but also higher quality and
lower costs: “Doing it fast forces you to do it right the
first time.”4 Other firms capturing competitors’ atten-
tion for reducing development times include Motorola,
General Electric, and Boeing. These firms have substan-
tially reduced their time-to-market objectives — some-
times slashing them in half.
Product Development vs. Market
Penetration Cycle Times
Executives interested in reducing their firms’ product
development cycle times have a rich set of guidelines
and experiences from which to draw. Some excellent
books and review articles are available, and a reasonably
coherent set of recommendations can be made.5
EVERYONE IS SPEEDING PRODUCTS TO MARKET THESE DAYS. BUTREDUCING PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT TIME IS ONLY HALF OF THE
equation; the other half is penetrating the market quickly. The author
draws on published research and industry practice to develop five recom-
mendations for reducing market penetration time. He also develops a
tracking and diagnostic tool to help managers determine where their mar-
ket penetration strategy is weak.
Thomas S. Robertson is the John and Laura
Pomerantz Professor of Marketing at the
Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania.
He wrote this article while he was a visiting
professor at London Business School.
Much less attention has been given
to market penetration cycle time, that
is, the amount of time it takes to
reach maximum sales potential for a
new product. A major source of com-
petitive advantage thus remains: to
achieve reductions in the time-to-
market acceptance. Objectives similar
to those formulated for product de-
velopment might be developed in this
area, for example, to reduce the mar-
ket penetration cycle time by half.
Figure 1 shows the time line of prod-
uct development and market penetration.
The Logic of Rapid Market Penetration
In an earlier era, it was possible to build market penetra-
tion gradually. Companies could roll out products by
region, and competitive imitation took time. Packaged
goods firms, such as Procter & Gamble (P&G), Kraft,
and Lever, typically test-marketed and then engaged in
product launches to a sequence of regional U.S. mar-
kets. National distribution was reached within about
eighteen months. Entry to other markets — usually
Europe — came much later.
Pricing was typically an issue of either skimming or
penetration pricing. Skimming involves initially setting
the price high to “skim” profits and then decreasing prices
gradually to reach broader markets. Polaroid is the classic
example. Penetration pricing means setting low prices to
sell at high volume and quickly increase market share.
Texas Instruments in calculators is the usual example. 
In today’s competitive environment, however, the
firm rarely has the choice of gradual market penetration,
regional rollouts, or price skimming. One exception
may be under conditions of high patent protection, as
in pharmaceuticals (witness Wellcome’s controversial
pricing strategy for its AIDS drug, AZT). However,
even in pharmaceuticals, shorter product life cycles chal-
lenge the firm to achieve market penetration quickly.
The objective is to achieve steep acceleration of the sales
curve before further technological change dilutes the
product’s potential. 
Rapid sales acceleration is especially needed in tech-
nology-based products, such as computers, where life
cycles for products such as workstations have been
shortening; sometimes it may be a matter of months be-
fore new competitive products appear. A similar pattern
of shortening product life cycles for products as dis-
parate as cosmetics, food, and pharmaceuticals has been
documented.6 
The concept of a market window also suggests the
need for rapid market penetration. Abell has argued that
there are often limited periods when the fit between the
market’s needs and the firm’s competencies are optimal.7
In product categories subject to rapid competitive
change, the market window may be open briefly before
it is too late to enter, due to competitive preemption.
For example, Federal Express pioneered in the U.S.
market with reliable expedited shipments, but it missed
the market window in Europe by using a rather dis-
jointed market-by-market strategy. In March 1992, it
was forced to shut down its intra-European system.
DHL and others, who had entered Europe early, had
built an insurmountable lead that Federal Express could
not overcome.
The net effect is that in the marketplace of the
1990s, new products must be introduced almost simul-
taneously worldwide. If an idea is put “on display” or in
test markets, it is likely to be co-opted by another firm
and to appear in world markets before the innovator’s
product. Indeed, many firms now find that the value of
test markets is overshadowed by the risks of revealing
one’s hand to competitors. Consequently, we’re seeing
more controlled testing with lead users or simulated test
markets in laboratory settings.
The disadvantages of test markets and regional roll-
outs are well documented in P&G’s entry to the cookie
market with its Duncan Hines soft cookies. This prod-
uct was test-marketed in Kansas City with enormous
success. However, competitors could read the results as
quickly as P&G could and before it could build adequate
production capacity and achieve national distribution,
Nabisco and Keebler preempted and reached national
markets before the Duncan Hines product. Their advan-
tage was the ready availability of production capacity.
Although this then led to a patent infringement suit
that was settled to P&G’s advantage, the Duncan Hines
product lost its momentum by entering markets behind
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Figure 1 Product Development–Market Penetration Time Line
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The process of product development and market penetration may overlap if the 
marketing effort begins before actual market introduction.
Nabisco and Keebler and never achieved the promise that
the Kansas City test market suggested.
Guidelines for Reducing Market
Penetration Cycle Time
How can firms reduce market penetration cycle times?
Drawing from research in innovation theory and diffu-
sion theory as well as management practice, I suggest
the following guidelines, subject to some qualifications.
1. Reach the market first. 
2. Preannounce the new product before market avail-
ability. 
3. Innovate constantly. 
4. Occupy the market — multiple brands, positionings,
segments, and alliances. 
5. Track market penetration by stage of the purchase de-
cision process. 
Reach the Market First
There are potential advantages and disadvantages of
being first to market, but the evidence is in favor of
being a market pioneer (see Table 1). Many pioneer
firms gain lasting market share advantage and may re-
main the top brand in their product category over
decades, especially in consumer goods.
Recent research gives some sense of the potential ad-
vantage of being first to market. Urban et al., using simu-
lated test market data for frequently purchased consumer
goods, found that the second firm to enter a market
could expect to do only 71 percent as
well in market share as the pioneer and
that the third firm to enter could ex-
pect to do only 58 percent as well.8
The value of market pioneering in in-
dustrial products has also been docu-
mented. Market pioneers tend to
achieve substantially higher market
shares: the early follower can expect to
do only 76 percent as well as the mar-
ket pioneer and the late entrant only
51 percent as well as the pioneer.9
The sources of these advantages are
the barriers to entry erected against
later entrants — assuming the pio-
neering product successfully fulfills
customer needs. Consumer advantage
emanates from the ability of the pio-
neer to achieve awareness, reputation,
trial, and brand loyalty before other firms enter. If the
new product successfully fulfills customer needs, trial
levels decline substantially for later entrants. Similarly,
the pioneer has the ability to choose the most profitable
market segments and to select the optimal product posi-
tioning. The market pioneer may also take advantage of
the insights provided by lead users, who are positioned
at the front of market trends.10 Market pioneers may
also gain access to the most efficient distribution chan-
nels, achieve greater experience and scale advantages to
reduce costs, and be able to assume price leadership.
And market pioneers may have the best opportunity to
set standards in industries such as communications,
where standards are important. 
Nevertheless, the market pioneer also faces some po-
tential disadvantages. The most important, of course, is
that most new products fail. Interestingly, this is often
not taken into account in extolling the virtues of market
pioneering. Additionally, the firm that engages in prod-
uct development ahead of later entrants encounters
higher R&D costs and runs the risk of entering the
market with a suboptimal product or a premature tech-
nology. A common scenario is the early market entrant
that achieves rapid market penetration but cannot hold
it as superior new products enter. For example, General
Electric quickly moved to a second generation CT scan-
ner and took the market away from EMI, a small U.K.
firm. Finally, although product life cycles have short-
ened, the takeoff point for some technologies is still
slow. The takeoff of fax technology, for example, came
many years after product availability. Some technolo-
gies, such as multimedia — combining computers and
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Table 1 Market Pioneer Advantages and Disadvantages
Potential Advantages Potential Disadvantages
Higher levels of awareness Most new products fail
Superior reputation Higher R&D costs
Higher rates of customer trial Risk of premature technology
Greater likelihood of brand loyalty Risk of suboptimal product features
Selection of most profitable segments Higher costs of market development
Selection of optimal positioning May create a market for competitors
Insights from lead users Timing may be premature for product takeoff
Choice of most efficient distribution 
channels
Lower costs due to greater experience 
and scale
Price leadership
Opportunity to set standards
videodisks in an interactive mode — have
been heralded by many analysts but have not
yet reached takeoff. The danger is that the
first firm to market may not receive a return
on investment for many years in technologies
that are slow to take off.
The bottom line, however, is that the ad-
vantages seem to outweigh the disadvantages.
Nevertheless, each new product introduction
is unique, and companies must weigh the
pros and cons of first entry and delayed entry.
Large firms often have been assumed to have
the capability to overcome not being first to
market, but this philosophy seems to be
changing. General Electric’s CEO Jack Welch
now advocates first-to-market advantage, and even mar-
ket leaders such as AT&T have found it difficult to
catch up in communication hardware when they have
lost first-to-market initiative in new product categories.
Preannounce before Market Availability
Can a faster takeoff be gained by announcing the new
product to customers before market introduction? High
technology products are frequently (and confidentially)
preannounced to key accounts, but what about broad
announcements, such as IBM’s preannouncement of its
PS/2 personal computer some months before general
product availability? 
In a recent survey of marketing managers across a
range of U.S. industries, 51 percent reported that their
firm preannounced its last new product or service.11 The
timing of these preannouncements ranged from one
month in advance of product availability to twenty-four
months, with the median being between three and four
months. A rule of thumb is that if the product is to be
preannounced, the timing should be as far in advance as
the length of the customer’s purchase decision process.
For example, if customers take on average six months to
make a decision on a new machine tool, then the prod-
uct should be preannounced six months in advance.
Otherwise, the firm’s first sale will be some time after
the product’s market introduction.
Although I am focusing on preannouncements to
customers, in certain cases preannouncing might also
have value for preempting competitors. Alcan Alu-
minum of Canada recently announced the successful
production of a new aluminum composite material and
emphasized its production capability: “A scale of this
magnitude continues to place Alcan in a commanding
lead worldwide in the establishment of aluminum com-
posite production capability and plant capacity.”12
Similarly, Glaxo announced in advance of market intro-
duction that it had made “massive investments in build-
ings, equipment, and human resources” for its new
biotech “drug colony stimulating factor.”13 In both
cases, these preannouncements could be interpreted as
directed at competitors, to discourage competitive entry.
They were also strong signals of market commitment to
potential customers.
Table 2 outlines the logic of whether new products
should be preannounced, focusing on customer, as op-
posed to competitor, issues. Three categories are ger-
mane: market factors, customer behavior factors, and
value chain factors.
Market Factors
Preannouncing is desirable if the firm has low market
share, competes in an industry with low competitive re-
activity, has strong patent protection, needs to establish
market standards, and could gain image and reputation
value by preannouncing. If the opposite of these condi-
tions holds, the firm should not preannounce.
• Market Share. A firm that has high market domi-
nance within the product category will not benefit from
preannouncing new products. Preannouncements run
the risk of cannibalizing sales from present products.
Alternatively, if the firm has low market presence within
the product category, cannibalization risks are low, and
it is in the firm’s best interest to delay customer purchas-
es until its new product enters the market. If the firm is
not participating in a product category, the objective of
preannouncing is to freeze the market until its new
product appears.
• Competitive Reactivity. In industries or product cate-
gories characterized by high levels of competitive reac-
tion, preannouncing is not recommended. If competi-
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Table 2 Product Preannouncement 
Can Market Advantage Be Gained by Preannouncing New Products?
Yes, if:
Market Factors • Low market share
• Low competitive reactivity
• Strong patent protection
• Need to establish standards
• Image-reputation value
Customer Behavior Factors • High new-product learning requirements
• High switching costs
• Lengthy customer decision process
Value Chain Factors • Need for complementary products
• Need to develop supply or distribution systems
tive reaction is limited or unlikely, it is in the firm’s best
interest to act aggressively. The level of competitive reac-
tivity is a function not only of the number of competi-
tors but also of how vigorously and how directly they
compete with one another. Firms in niche positions are
in a better position to preannounce because there is less
threat from competitors, as are small firms that may
tend to be ignored by other competitors.
• Patent Protection. Patent protection builds a certain
immunity to retaliation. This is one reason behind the
high number of preannouncements in the pharmaceuti-
cals industry. 
• Standards. In many industries, especially those that
are technology based, the creation of a dominant stan-
dard is important. The development of such a standard
is highly dependent on achieving rapid consumer accep-
tance; preannouncing may be beneficial. In handwriting
recognition computers, for example, the battle is on to
determine which operating system will become the sys-
tem of choice; competitors such as GO Corporation
and Microsoft have been scrambling to outdo each
other on product announcements before availability. 
• Image/Reputation. Preannouncing is also recom-
mended if it will improve the firm’s image and reputa-
tion. Fujitsu’s leap to preannounce its new mainframes
on the day before IBM’s system 390 preannouncement
would seem to be motivated by a desire to seize the ini-
tiative and create a leading-edge perception. It is diffi-
cult to build a reputation based on parity products, but
early preannouncements of innovative products may ac-
crue significant benefits to the firm. A risk, however, is
if the product does not enter the market as scheduled.
Many software firms are accused of announcing “vapor-
ware,” which never appears or which comes out with
significant features missing. Such problems build mar-
ket skepticism toward the firm and its announcements.
Customer Behavior Factors
Certain patterns of customer behavior may favor pre-
announcements. 
• Customer Learning. Preannouncing a new product
will be advantageous if the product requires substantial
customer learning. This will be the case for many tech-
nology-based products, as opposed to packaged goods.
It may be especially desirable to preannounce to more
sophisticated consumers and leading-edge accounts,
which may be more receptive to new product ideas and
more capable of learning. They will also have dispropor-
tionate influence on other customers in the market.
• Switching Costs. If customers must undertake sub-
stantial one-time costs to convert to the new product,
then preannouncing is recommended. Switching costs
can be a major factor in retarding adoption of a new
product. Preannouncing may allow the customer to
plan far enough ahead to minimize switching costs or
spread them over multiple periods.
• Length of Decision Process. If the customer’s decision
process is long, then preannouncing may be necessary.
Telecommunication utilities, for example, make budget-
ing decisions for new switching equipment two years 
or more before installation. If the product is not pre-
announced, the first sales may be months or years away. 
Value Chain Factors
In many cases, the sale of new products depends on the
participation and commitment of other firms in the
value chain. Preannouncement may be necessary in
order to build this participation. Preannouncement is
advisable when the product needs complementary prod-
ucts or the firm needs to build supply or distribution
commitments.
• Complementary Products. Many new products re-
quire complementary products to be of value to the
consumer. For example, microwaves were of limited
value until food manufacturers adopted microwaveable
plastic trays, and videocassette recorders (VCRs) were of
limited value until movies became available on cassettes.
Generally, the more dependent the new product is on
complementary products, the more important pre-
announcing will be. Thus, a key motivation for IBM to
preannounce its PS/2 personal computer was to encour-
age software developers to begin writing programs for
its OS/2 operating system. Similarly, NCR and GRiD
Systems’ launches of their pen-based computers were
preceded by announcements in order to encourage de-
velopment of application software. 
• Supply and Distribution Systems. For certain prod-
ucts, the ability to penetrate the market depends on ac-
cess to supply or distribution. If either is in question,
preannouncement might signal commitment to the
product and encourage such relationships. For example,
favorable distribution relationships are critical in indus-
tries where sales are dependent on distributor sales 
support rather than end-consumer advertising. Pre-
announcements can help distributors avoid inventory
problems and may build a sense of partnership between
the firm and its distributors.
Innovate Constantly 
Market penetration is rarely accomplished with a single,
discrete innovation; a constant stream of innovation is
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necessary. Thus, as a firm is reaching the market
with an innovation, it must already be planning
improvements and replacements.
The need for unremitting innovation resides
first in the competitive environment. Inevitably,
successful new products engender imitation.
Building barriers to entry, especially patents, is
highly desirable, but the ultimate defense is a
strong offense: constantly raising the innovative
ante. In fact, if the firm prematurely pursues scale
efficiencies as a barrier to entry, it may simply
lock itself into a technology that becomes obso-
lete as the battle moves to second- or third-gener-
ation products.
Consumer demands also necessitate unremit-
ting innovation. A new product may be enthusi-
astically accepted, but consumers inevitably seek
improved benefits. Despite the acceptance of
Sony’s Walkman, consumers wanted it even
smaller, lighter, in alternative designs, for sports,
and so forth. If Sony had rested on its laurels for
even a few months, competitors could have seized the
initiative (and to some extent did) by capitalizing on
this escalation process.
Benefit modification (or repositioning) may also be
necessary for some innovations, especially to reach
broader segments of the market. Manufacturers origi-
nally envisioned microwave ovens as a replacement for
the kitchen stove, a concept that did not sell. But when
microwaves were repositioned as a secondary method of
cooking and their size was reduced to fit on the kitchen
counter, they successfully penetrated the market.
Unfortunately for the pioneer firms, such as Litton, it
was the later entrants, Japanese and Korean manufactur-
ers, that performed these redefinitions and benefited
from them.
Managing the Innovation Continuum
How does a firm constantly innovate? Innovation runs on
a continuum from enhancements to migrations to inven-
tions. The challenge is to manage the total continuum.
Enhancements involve minor changes in established
patterns of consumption or production, usually within
one generation of technology. Enhancements may fine-
tune the product to customer needs or add value to
reach new market segments. In some industries, such as
consumer packaged goods, most of the innovation that
takes place is enhancement. But even in high-technolo-
gy markets, enhancements can be a major source of
profits.
Migrations involve more significant changes in estab-
lished patterns of consumption or production, such as
development of a new generation of technology. For ex-
ample, whereas first generation CT scanners could per-
form head scans, second generation CT scanners could
perform whole body scans.
Inventions create new patterns of consumption or
production — the first CT scanner, personal computer,
or jet engine. Inventions can totally change an industry’s
competitive structure, although their occurrence is occa-
sional and difficult to predict.
Boeing has successfully managed the innovation con-
tinuum, as shown in Figure 2. The 737 jet, which was
initially introduced in 1968, is now in its fifth enhance-
ment, the 737-500, and a sixth was recently announced.
Boeing’s enhancements take advantage of evolving tech-
nologies (in engines, avionics, and metal composites) to
keep the product up-to-date and extend its capabilities,
thus potentially expanding its opportunities into new
routes or segments and keeping competitors at bay by
revealing no weakness.
Migration occurs as technology improves, allowing
the introduction of significantly more advanced aircraft.
Boeing has developed a stream of new generation air-
craft, from the 707 to the 777, which is now in early
phases of production. 
Boeing is also aware of the possibility of inventions,
which create entirely new functionality. Perhaps vertical
take off and landing combined with supersonic trans-
port speeds (VTOL-SST) will become viable. Boeing
cannot run the risk of being late to market with such an
Figure 2 Constant Innovation: Boeing's Current Portfolio of
Enhancements and Migrations
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invention, much as the Douglas Aircraft Company was
late to market with a jet aircraft, the DC-8, after leading
the market for multiple decades during the propeller
era. The cost for Douglas was a loss of leadership and
acquisition by McDonnell to become McDonnell
Douglas.
To manage the total innovation continuum, firms
must exploit the range of opportunities, from those that
may have only minor effects on consumption patterns
to those that create whole new consumption patterns.
Undue focus on either end of the continuum may cause
problems. For example, the firm may focus only on en-
hancements and miss the change to new technologies. It
may focus only on invention and go out of business be-
fore the product becomes a commercial reality. 
Occupy the Market
Market penetration requires the blanketing of the mar-
ket with multiple products, positionings, and some-
times even multiple brands to occupy the spectrum of
segmentation opportunities. Hamel and Prahalad give
the example of Toshiba in laptop computers:
Toshiba’s blistering pace of product introduction al-
lowed it to explore almost every possible market niche
and to outrun rivals. . . . If one particular model
failed, its withdrawal would hardly cause a ripple. . . . 
By 1991 Toshiba had discontinued more laptop
models than some of its flat-footed competitors had
launched.14
The objective is to occupy the market and leave little
room for competitive entry. One study gives evidence of
the danger of neglecting market positionings. Cook and
Rothberg found a Spearman rank correlation of .81 be-
tween share of the car market and share of models.15
They argue that as U.S. automakers have reduced the
number of models in their lines in order to pursue stan-
dardization and cost efficiency, they have failed to meet
a full range of customer needs and thus have lost market
share. Neglected market positionings may invite compe-
tition and limit the firm’s ability to substantially pene-
trate the market.
A company may also need to launch multiple brands
in order to penetrate the market. IBM has finally suc-
cumbed to market pressure and introduced Ambra — a
clone of its own personal computer that does not carry
the IBM name — to its European operation.16 The
IBM brand name simply cannot cover the entire mar-
ket, including the low end. Procter & Gamble is a mas-
ter at using multiple brands to achieve high levels of
market penetration, whether in detergents, soaps, or
even diapers. The basic premise is that market needs are
diverse and that multiple brands are necessary to occupy
the set of product positionings that are available. It is
better to create your own competition than to allow
other manufacturers to compete with you. 
Of course, there are disadvantages to multiposition-
ing or multibrand strategies. The most obvious is cost:
creating multiple brands is expensive. Possible confusion
is another potential disadvantage; customers may fail to
appreciate the subtleties among multiple brands. There
is also the risk of the firm losing focus and diluting its
core brands. Finally, many firms have achieved success
by dominating a segment or a niche and choosing not
to compete in the total market.
Building Alliances
Successful market penetration also depends on the abili-
ty to develop global alliances. A single firm usually lacks
the resources, talent, and time to penetrate global mar-
kets before a product loses its innovative advantage.
Some of the world’s largest firms are pursuing alliances
to achieve faster and broader levels of penetration. 
Alliances can afford broader market access. General
Mills has formed a joint venture with Nestlé to gain bet-
ter access to the European market for its cereal brands
(see Figure 3). The alliance combines Nestlé and General
Mills cereals in one portfolio supplemented by addition-
al cereal brands acquired from Ranks Hovis McDougall
of the United Kingdom. In biotech drugs, Genetics
Institute has formed alliances with European and Japan-
ese partners to gain access to their markets. In comput-
ers, most of the major manufacturers are forming al-
liances with value-added resellers and other indirect
channels in order to reach a broader range of accounts,
particularly smaller accounts.
Alliances can also deepen market access. For exam-
ple, both Roche and Glaxo sold Glaxo’s anti-ulcer drug
Zantac in the U.S. market. Glaxo did not have a large
enough detail force to cover the market and capitalize
on the opportunity by itself. Similarly, both ICI Phar-
maceuticals and Thomas Morson, a Merck subsidiary,
sell the same A.C.E. inhibitor, but under different
names (Zestril and Carace, respectively) in order to gain a
higher level of salesforce coverage with physicians. 
Alliances can also be valuable for developing a domi-
nant standard. Firms may even create their own compe-
tition in order to achieve a dominant standard. In work-
stations, for example, many analysts believe that only
two or three standards can survive. Thus Sun is encour-
aging competitors to use its SPARC chip, and IBM is
entering into alliances with Apple and Digital Equip-
ment Corporation to use its RS-6000 chip. A high-tech
firm that is not aligned with one of the dominant stan-
dards is unlikely to be able to participate in the market
at all, as software is not going to be written for minor
players, and customers are seeking compatibility and
low switching costs. In the battle for VCR standards,
Matsushita broadly licensed its VHS format as part of
its strategy to achieve dominance over Sony’s Beta for-
mat. The new battle in compact discs pits Sony’s mini-
disc against Philip’s digital disc. Each company is seek-
ing alliances to gain the edge.
Track Market Penetration by Customer
Decision Stage 
Not only must a company establish rapid penetration, it
must also develop a tracking and diagnostic system to
measure its success. The key to rapid sales acceleration is
moving customers quickly through the purchase deci-
sion process. The company must be
capable of tracking each customer (or
segment of customers) and monitor-
ing progress toward purchase.
The idea that customers must prog-
ress through a sequence of stages be-
fore purchase is hardly new. The basic
process is as follows: When a new
product is introduced, the firm must
(1) build awareness among potential
customers, (2) move these potential
customers to a favorable attitude to-
ward the product, (3) encourage trial,
and (4) achieve purchase (repeat pur-
chase, in most cases).17 Of course, some-
times phases are skipped or others
added. For example, marketers may
provide free samples, especially in con-
sumer goods, to short-circuit the deci-
sion process. For tracking and diag-
nostic purposes, however, these four
phases provide the necessary informa-
tion.
It is critically important to track po-
tential customers over time. The firm
needs to know, at any given moment,
what percentage of the market has
reached each stage. Only then will it
be able to decide what to do in order
to further penetration. Consider the
introduction of a new product to the market on 1
January 1993. The graphs in Figure 4 illustrate four pos-
sible scenarios that might occur by 31 December 1993.
They are based on quarterly tracking surveys.
Low Awareness
In this scenario, sales are being held back because of the
inability to develop awareness, which is at the 35 per-
cent level among potential customers. Low awareness is
usually a communication problem, and the remedy gen-
erally is to increase advertising or direct mail spending
and salesforce coverage.   
Low Favorable Attitude
This scenario is somewhat more troublesome than low
awareness because it might suggest a lack of acceptance
for the product or service concept. Although awareness
is now at over 95 percent, favorable attitude has reached
only the 25 percent level. Low levels of favorable atti-
tude often indicate that customers have not been given
sufficient positive information. The firm may need to
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Figure 3 Alliances to Achieve a Pan-European Portfolio
Nestlé
• World's largest food company
• International brand equity
• Strong distribution system
• But few cereal brands
Cereals include:
• Chocapic
• Sportis
General Mills
• Strong range of cereal brands
• Cereal marketing expertise
• But little international presence
Cereals include:
• Cheerios/Honey Nut Cheerios
• Golden Grahams
• Wheaties
• Trix
• Each partner contributes $80 million
• CP to market cereal brands outside of the United States 
    and Canada under the Nestlé trademark
Joint venture (1989) creates:
Cereal Partners (CP)
• CP pays acquisition price of $167 million
Acquisition (1990) of:
Ranks Hovis McDougall (UK) Cereal Brands
Acquired cereal brands include:
• Shreddies
• Shredded Wheat
add more salespeople or trade demonstrations or change
the communication campaign to better demonstrate the
product benefits. However, if consumers are reasonably
informed and many are rejecting the product, the com-
pany may need to be content with a narrow segment,
drawing customers from the 25 percent of the market
with favorable attitudes. Contact lenses, for example,
tend to fit this profile; they have failed to convert a large
profile of the population, despite product improvements
such as soft and long-wearing lenses. Alternatively, the
product may need to be modified to reach a broader
market. 
Low Trial Rate
In this scenario, awareness and attitude have developed
nicely, but the market is not converting to trial. Com-
mon causes of this problem are (1) poor distribution —
the product is not readily available, (2) pricing — the
price is too high, and (3) communications — the adver-
tising campaign is too focused on reach (exposure to
many possible customers), when it should be focused on
frequency (the number of ad exposures per potential
customer). These areas should be reevaluated.
Low Purchase (or Low Repeat Purchase)
This is the worst problem. The new product is perform-
ing well on all stages except purchase or repeat purchase.
Either the product does not deliver on its promises or
the product’s benefits have been oversold. Product re-
design or repositioning (even withdrawal) may then be
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Figure 4 Typical Market Penetration Scenarios
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necessary. Sometimes, however, a low repeat purchase rate
is due to pricing or distribution; price reductions and ex-
panded or better directed distribution may be helpful. 
In summary, achieving rapid sales acceleration means
moving customers through the purchase decision pro-
cess expeditiously. This requires more than simply ap-
propriating a certain level of marketing resources. It re-
quires a tracking system that decomposes awareness,
attitude, trial, and purchase in order to develop in-
formed diagnoses of what types and levels of marketing
resources will be required at different points in time.
Conclusion
Speed is a management imperative, especially in the do-
main of new products. However, being quick to market
is only half the battle. An equally important challenge is
to shorten the time to market penetration. A product’s
chances of long-run sales success are enhanced if it can
achieve rapid market access and penetration. However,
the battle for long-term supremacy depends on constant
and unremitting innovation. Successful new products
are an invitation to market entry for other competitors.
As product life cycles become shorter and the speed of
imitation increases, ongoing innovation is the only sus-
tainable strategy for success.
We are all familiar with the typical S-shaped product
life cycle. We also recognize that it is not the optimal
sales curve. In general, firms want maximum sales accel-
eration; the objective is to penetrate the market and
seize the competitive initiative. 
I have made five recommendations for reducing mar-
ket penetration time:
• Reach the market first.
• Preannounce the new product. 
• Innovate constantly.
• Occupy the market.
• Track market penetration by stage of the purchase de-
cision process.
The era when firms had the luxury of slowly rolling
out products may be gone. Innovation advantage dissi-
pates quickly, and imitation is rampant. A firm must
design global penetration strategies before market
launch. If it does not achieve simultaneous market ac-
cess, the opportunity is soon lost. If it does not blanket
the market, competitors will find entry gaps. If it does
not engage in constant innovation, it soon becomes ob-
solete. Such is the competitive arena we face, and there
is no reason to believe that competition will ease or be-
come less reactive. 
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